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OPERATIONAL SPACE SUPPORT TO TACTICAL FORCES
The driving reasons for developing space systems in DOD at the dawn of the 
space age were strategic in nature. Arms control and intettigence constituted space 
imperatives at the height of the Cold War. Tactical applications came later and with 
much less priority.
Although much of this division of priorities continues today, Space Support to 
the Warflghters has become an increasingly common theme. Acquisition driven by 
combat related requirements is the new imperative by which development 
organizations must abide. We've become so quickly attuned to this activity that we 
have identified a separate mission area and given it a name: Force Enhancement. 
We talk about it as though we knew what it was, and refer to it as though others 
understand what we mean. In fact, very few understand the term. Many engaged in the 
area are even working counter to our warfighters' true needs.
To understand such an argumentative statement, consider the following 
observations. Ground mobile forces (which also include air units) must have small, 
rugged1 radio receivers in order to operate in a battle zone. They need to take their 
comm with them when they move, and they need to move in a hostile environment. 
These forces also need assured access to communications networks so they get the 
support they need when they need it. Their lives depend on responsiveness and they 
cannot tolerate delays in critical combat situations. Their comm requirements are 
simple: keep it small, rugged, and! guarantee access.
• These tactical users took at' today's MILSATCOM systems with targe 20 foot 
antennas, and they look at their own low priority on the communications pedting 
order, and it becomes painfully obvious that those systems are not scratching their Hch. 
They were buiM and continue to be maintained for a different breed of user.
With this In mind, operational space commands ~ chartered to advocate space 
solutions to tactical terrestrial problems - have rushed forward with the answer: 
Taesats! Dedicated to individual CINCs - available to ops units whenever they need 
ii - to go to war with manpack receivers and guaranteed connectivity*
Unfortunately, this "solution" is only an illusion. Small satellites do not equate to 
small terminals.
A small, disadvantaged receiver antenna needs increased transmitter power to 
close a comm link. This additional "gain" must come from somewhere - most likely a 
combination of larger satellite antennas, more power from the satellite, or directional 
beam steering. Large antennas cost volume and weight, more power requires more or 
larger batteries, and directional beams mean extra weight for computing receiver 
positions and driving antennas. The bottom line: tactical receivers require more help 
from satellites, not less. Put another way, tactical receivers are not compatible with 
tactical satellites.
Furthermore, when U.S. forces go to war, they cam tolerate electronic jammers 
stepping on their comm. To remedy this problem, they need to do two things. First, for 
those users who must truly communicate during conflict, they need to leave the 
narrow, cluttered confines of the UHF frequency band. Second, they need to employ 
anti-jam techniques. Now, many of these techniques involve dividing a message into 
small bits and transmitting them repeatedly at random points in frequency. This, in 
turn, requires signal processing, which further requires computer capacity and comm 
modifications - in other words, more weight. You can add the weight on the satellite or 
on the receiver. Which end truly needs to be lightweight and "tactical?"
Again, searching for the bottom line in the comm area, we find that our forces 
need assured access to tactical comm, they aren't well served by present 
MILSATCOM systems, but our rush to sell them Tacsats may not be well founded 
either. What they really need is a better DSCS (Defense Satellite Communications 
System) - optimized for disadvantaged terminals with larger antennas and with
capacity for our Ground Mobile Forces. An improved COMSAT would 
provide more channels, more power, and continued commonality with the DSCS 
waveform. channels might be easily achieved by following commercial SATCOM 
and cross-polarization to double the channels available. More power 
is a of "Demand access" allocation of available 
transponders (DAMA) fixed assignment of transponders to individual users 
would also open up and ensure that users gain access when they need it.
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The truth is, that with a limited number of relatively simple steps, nearly all 
MILSATCOM shortfalls can be redressed. A completely new way of doing business - 
i.e. TACSATs - does not appear to be called for.
Similar statements might be made regarding intelligence support, environmental 
sensing, wide area surveillance, and every other Force Enhancement mission area.
Our credo must be that if we can't put it in a mobile commander's hands in a 
realistic, credible manner, then we are not doing our job. Tactical satellites are 
absolutely beside the point. What we need is tactical user equipment - small, 
rugged, and usable in today's combat environment.
Attached is a notional system illustrating my meaning in this regard. It shows a 
fictional Army support vehicle perhaps ten years from now. I call it the Space 
Hummer. (Hummer is a nickname derived from HMMV - High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle.) It looks conventional enough, but it represents the culmination of 
wide-ranging changes that have (by then) affected entire satellite constellations and 
system designs.
Inside it is a comm terminal compatible with a universal modem that can receive 
and process data and voice on UHF. SHF and EHF frequencies* The UHF receiver 
uses an omnidirectional blade antenna mounted on top of the 'van. The SHF and! EHF 
receivers share a dish antenna shown here as set up next to the van. but which 
be structurally integrated to it. The advantage of "iremoiifig" the antenna is to 
the position of the van itself from unfriendly forces who may be to on 
transmissions. This antenna is selectively pointed acconfng to 
which the operator intends to join.
MILSATCOM use has already grown to serve In ten 
years,, Army units will certainly have incorporated them down to the level and 
all special forces units will be similarly equipped, They will then have available to them 
secure, reliable, anti-jam communications that is small, rugged, mobile, and with 
guaranteed access. They will no longer be burdened by large trucks, huge antennas, 
or easily jammed radios. In order to accommodate this new user community, the 
DSCS satellites and constellations will have to undergo a degree of
Also contained in this van is a terminal for receiving weather data. It will take in 
information from DOD, civil, commercial, and even foreign satellites, tt will integrate 
this data with lateral tell weather updates sent by Army, Navy, Air Force and allied 
units all over the theater. This local information will be incorporated into an 
amalgamated feed to tactical units and processed for easily understood display. It is 
going to enable critical choices to be made with regard to weapons sensitive to 
moisture, temperature, wind velocity, etc. It will allow commanders to anticipate 
changing conditions such as soggy battlefields, limited visibility, and severe storm 
fronts which will directly affect conduct of the battle. In short, it will provide up-to-the- 
minute, precise, decision-making assistance to tactical commanders of engaged 
forces. Again, unseen in this drawing are the changes wrought in our Defense 
Meteorological Satellite System. These changes will allow receipt of realtime smooth 
data to flow to small, tactical receivers. The change will be relatively small. It will 
probably make Army commanders wonder why it took so long to implement.
One prominent display available to our Space Hummer operator provides 
selective looks at enemy forces. He can call up on his multi-use display screen, and 
also print out, scenes of enemy air activity taken from organic air defense radars, 
A WAGS, and Space-Based Radar. Images from all three sources will be fused and 
displayed in the same proportions against a common map background. Or, he can use 
the same screen and select a view of enemy ground forces in a variety of area 
magnifications. Data on electronic emitters, gathered by a variety of resources, will be 
integrated into one presentation. JSTARS (E-8) aircraft will data link information from 
their powerful radars and provide detailed looks at enemy ground vehicles behind the 
lines. Optical images of varying degrees of clarity will also be available and selectable. 
All these sources of information on ground forces can be individually selected to 
appear on the screen or mixed and matched as integrated data, tailored to the 
'Commander's needs.
Unseen in this image, however, are tremendous improvements and changes 
which will enable such solid support to become available. Connectivity at the unit level 
will be increased sufficiently to guarantee reliable, secure connection with sufficient
bandwidth to transmit a wide variety of data Increases in computer processing speed 
and capacity, along with corresponding reductions in size, weight, cost, and heat must
be dramatic to allow integration of all this data and reduction to a useable, human- 
centered form. Satellites and other sensor platforms which contribute information to
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this vehicle must all be reconfigured to optimize their support to small, mobile, 
combatant units.
In other words, the center of the Force Enhancement world will have to change 
from one based on satellites and sensors to one based on users - warfighters. There 
will have to be major behind the scenes changes to make it happen, but once those 
changes are complete, we will finally have the cart back in front of the horse.
Of course some things don't need to change. The Space Hummer will know its 
position with extremely high precision. Rugged, pocket-sized GPS receivers have 
been available for years. Using standard ground forces comm nets and JTIDS in 
conjunction with full integration of GPS receivers across all services, will ensure thai 
all allied forces maintain full and continuous situation awareness regarding friendly 
locations. This will certainly increase force coordination and effectiveness significantly,
Since this Space Hummer is pictured out on its own, we might imagine that it is 
part of a Special Forces deployment. In that case, its '"space connection" would be 
even more helpful. For, while enroute in the SOF C-130, the Space Hummer will be 
plugged into the aircraft to gain access to external power and an external antenna. It 
will be fully up and functional during the entire deployment flight and 
covert Insertion. C3 with the force should be continuous. Regular updates on 
enemy ground vehicle, air, and electronic activity in the destination be 
available all the way in. Diversion for unexpected weather would be possible In slFiort, 
by being totally compatible with transport aircraft, and ships, the Space Hummer 
ensures what enroute SOF forces need most - NO SURPRISES!
' But how achievable is this so-called Space Hummer concept, and how firm are 
the requirements behind it?
It is certainly a very achievable project if done in a step-by-step apptoach using
proven technology. Many companies and agencies in DOD are currently working on
pieces that would fit right in.
A MILSATCOM architecture study is currently underway by AFSPACECOM which
starts with user receiver requirements and works backwards to space 
solutions. This effort was undertaken at: the request of HQ USAF for the Faga
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Investment Strategy Review. It will point out exactly how to modify or replace current 
MILSATCOM support to mobile forces in the manner described earlier. At the same 
time, a variety of companies have very advanced efforts underway to develop small, 
rugged receivers at the higher frequency ranges. These typically use one meter as the 
largest acceptable antenna size. So, in the comm area, efforts are underway which 
will produce a high fidelity, fully achievable roadmap leading to a Hummer-like 
capability.
The DMSP Program Office has plans to implement a small, realtime data smooth 
direct downlink receiver in the Block 5D series. With Block 6, such service will be 
mandatory. Air Weather Service, in addition, has produced a roadmap which shows 
how, when, and why to integrate information from a variety of ground, airborne, and 
space-based weather sensors in a mobile, battlefield capability. This is not difficult 
technically. It is largely a question of policy.
Multiple efforts are underway to integrate intelligence information of various kinds 
from various sources into a single, simple, human-centered display. Such a display 
would also include JSTARS products and fuse it together to create a full picture of 
enemy ground vehicle activity. Information from Space-Based Wide Area Surveillance 
systems likewise look to integrate into this common architecture with information on 
enemy airborne activity. The efforts we currently see are diverse but all headed in 
generally the right direction. Challenges include not only data fusion, but secure, 
wideband connectivity. What is needed as much as development, however, is a single 
integrator capable of focusing the diverse ongoing efforts into a single, manageable 
initiative.
What about requirements? Current, validated requirements exist for comm, 
weather, intel support, surveillance, etc. In each case they are written to advocate 
satisfaction of tactical user needs. Each program is at least exploring options to satisfy 
those needs. The question is whether there is anyone bringing it all together -- 
whether there is a requirement to put it all into one truck.
The answer is that no, there is no such requirement on the books. But we know 
that if we build something that is difficult to use or to carry along, then soldiers will 
simply leave it behind when they go to war. For example, the Army has lots of 
commercial terminals to receive civil/commercial weather data. But they leave DMSP
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behind when they go to the field. Is there a requirement therefore for a small, mobile 
DMSP terminal? I believe so.
Does satellite comm have to fit in a manpack? Not necessarily, but it certainly has 
to fit into a small and inconspicuous enough package that the position of a field 
headquarters won't be given away. And the package must be mobile so it can be 
carried along - or else it will be left behind. Does it have to fit in a manpack? Pretty 
close.
Bottom line. Does all Force Enhancement equipment have to fit in a single 
Hummer? No. But it's not bad as a goal.
Force Enhancement.
It's a space mission area. DOD and service policies defined the job that must be 
done. Now military space organizations have to take it seriously. They have to know 
what it is, and what it isn't.
It doesnl care a whit about space systems or how big they are. It cares about 
making combat units more effective - smarter, better coordinated, able to surprise 
enemies without being surprised, able to shoot when they hit the ground.
If we want to build tactical, warfighting systems, we should start at the warfighters 
end. Everything else must flow from that. It may turn out that "tactical space system" is 
not an oxymoron after all - but that "tactical satellite" is.
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HARRIS
SHF Man Transportable Terminal 
Series 1000
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Applications
The Harris SHF Man Transportable Terminal 
(MTT) is a lightweight,, rugged, and modular radio 
wnich provides voice and data communications 
over DSCS, NATO,, and SKYNET satellites lor a 
wde range of applications including: .
Intelligence gathering 
Reconnaissance 
Crisis management 
Pararescue operations 
LPI/LPD communications
System Concept
The Karris SHF MTT system provides both 
point-to-point and broadcast capability for voice 
and data on demand. It consists of up to 128 
ihcividual MTTs,. a Network Control Applique at'a 
larger satellite terminal, and the Network Control 
software.
The Network Control Applique (NCA) hardware 
and software provide unattended control of MTT 
network communications. The NCA controls the nee and relays data in real-time between MTTs* The NCA equipment interfaces with an existing earth terminal, such as the AN/TSC-100A at 70 
and is compatible with existing up/down 
conveiers and IF patching* 'The NCA cam 
operate concurrently with the existing earth tercrtrars traffic. The control terminal requires a 2p-foo: or lager antenna to11 assure efficient use of saseSte resources. The NCA requires 5*1/4* of rack height, so it easily its into the smallest of earth stations. The NCA is also compatible with 
saielKte resource planning functions.
Network Operations
Harris Network Control software is the key to' 
rapid and efficient connectivity between the 
and the management of satellite and network 
terminal resources.
Communication .assets are managed a 
Demand Assigned Multiple .Access 
scheme, DAMA provides resources to on 
an as needed basis, then reallocates to 
other users,
The NCA provides control of network
transmit capabilities; terminals
without its concurrence. The MTT
levels are also controlled directly by the toassure efficient use of satellite resources.
The Harris network control software is 
to maximize the available is will is minimize call set-up times, ere 
generally available a lew after the request.
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Communications Capabilities
T*e S'^F MTT provides secure voice and data 
ccTi^LTvcations from 75 b/s to 2.4 kb/s. The 
N'"Ts contain a built-in cryptographic module 
a*"d vocoder to provide the secure voice/data I/O 
caoao! :-es. The MTT also provides an auxiliary 
!, 0 po': *or user-supplied devices. The user I/O 
pen sjcoorts a variety of physical/electrical 
isre-ace protocols.
T~e ^ocular construction of the MTT permits a 
var 'e:y cr configurations. Combinations of the 
mancac'v, transit case, and vehicle mounted 
s\ ste^s can be configured from the standard
rrocLes of the Harris MTT system.
NETWORK 
CONTROLLER
NETWORK 
CONTROL 
PROCESSOR
NETWORK CONTROL APPLIQUE (NCA)
SHOCK
MOUNTED
ELECTRONICS
Summary of Features
• Efficient use of satellite resources
• Flexible, expandable rapid response DAMA 
system
• Secure voice and data communications
• Positive control of resources
• MIMIC technology enhances reliability
• Flexible configurations
• Manpack/vehicle/transit case
• Compatibility with existing assets
• NCA integrates easily with existing terminals
• Control system compatible with existing 
satellite planning functions
» Flexible input/output capability
• Interfaces with most existing I/O devices
• Built-in COMSEC vocoder
• Commonality of modules reduces ILS cost
• Full MIL Spec or ruggedized versions
• LPI/LPD performance superior to that of UHF 
TACSAT
CASE
TYPICAL VEHICLE INSTALLATION
CASE 40*2 
TRANSIT CASE CONFIGURATIONS
